Dunlop v. Bachowski 11 that the Secretary's decision not to sue is subject to judicial review at the instance of the complainant.' 2 This Note argues that judicial review under Bachowski has been unsatisfactory as a means of protecting individual rights and that the ultimate solution lies with the Department of Labor or Congress. 13 The review process contravenes the statutory goals of Title IV's enforcement scheme and provides inadequate protection for the complainant's interest in the suit. Indeed, the problem underlying the Bachowski litigation is that the Labor Department's investigatory process does not have rules and procedures necessary to ensure openness, apparent fairness, and sufficient consideration of the complainant's point of view. The Note proposes that Congress overrule Bachowski by amending Title IV to preclude judicial review and that judicial review be replaced by administrative procedures within the Labor Department. The recommended procedures, providing for informal hearing and review analogous to that used in NLRB cases, would give complainants a more meaningful voice without impairing the special enforcement goals of Title IV. 
. 1966) (Secretary's discretion reviewable by court). See also Hopson, Judicial Review of the Secretary of Labor's Decision Not to Sue to Set Aside a Union Election
Under Title IV of the LMRDA, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1281 REv. , 1302 REv. -05 (1972 (pre-Bachowski endorsement of judicial review of Secretary's decisions not to sue).
13. Scholarly commentary has noted and criticized Bachowski for its narrow scope of review, but without carefully analyzing the case's impact on national labor policy. See Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1975 , 28 AD. L. REv. 131, 143-44 (1976 
I. Problems with Judicial Review under Bachowski
In vesting the Secretary with exclusive power to bring Title IV suits, Congress's general goal was to provide an effective remedy for violations of Title IV's election requirements, but with minimum governmental interference in the affairs of labor unions.' 4 Behind this general goal of minimizing governmental interference are two specific goals: to prevent frivolous and decentralized litigation against unions' 5 and to settle quickly the cloud on officers' title when unmeritorious challenges are made against the validity of elections.' 6 The role of the Secretary in Title IV litigation is primarily to protect the "public interest"-the preservation of union democracy without undue intrusion into union affairs. Yet Congress also intended the Secretary to be the "lawyer" enforcing the complainant's right to free and democratic elections in his union. 7 The Bachowski Court implicitly recognized some conflict between the Secretary's broad power and discretion and his duty to protect the complainant's interests; the Court sought to reach a compromise between these competing concerns.' 8 Specifically, Bachowski presented two questions: whether the Secretary's decision not to bring a Title IV suit is subject to judicial 14 . See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1968) ; S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958) , reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 24-25; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1959) , reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 118; A. McADA MS, supra note 1, at 98; Mitchell, Safeguards for Union Democracy, in SYMPoslums ON LMRDA 135, 135-41 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961) .
15. The Conference Committee which drafted the final version of the LMRDA clearly intended the Secretary's suit to be the exclusive remedy for union election violations; the Committee rejected the House version, which authorized suits by union members. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1147 , 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 34-35 (1959 , reprinted in LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 835. This choice reflected Congress's fear that unions would be afflicted with harassing and diffuse litigation unless some agency could centralize litigation and screen out frivolous complaints. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 569-70, 573 (1975); Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 532-36 (1972) . See generally LaborManagement Reform Legislation: Hearings on S.505, S.748, S.76, S.1002 , S.1137 , and S.1311 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 135, 567, 578-79 (1959) (testimony reflecting unions' fear of frivolous litigation).
16. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 569, 573 (1975) ; Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.7 (1968) . Congress intended that union election challenges, unless warranted by the Secretary, should be disposed of quickly, so that the union's officers would not be hampered in acting for the union and in bargaining with employers.
17. 104 CONG. REC. 10947 (1958) (Sen. Kennedy, Senate sponsor of LMRDA). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975); Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1972) .
18. But see 17 B.C. INDus. & Coat. L. REv. 581, 595, 598 n.143 (1976) (under principles of administrative law, the Court's assumption that the Secretary's decision is not unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970) as "committed to agency discretion" is in conflict with the Court's conclusion that the scope of review must be very narrow because of the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary). review and, if so, what the proper scope of review should be. 19 The Supreme Court held the Secretary's decision reviewable, but limited review to examination of the Secretary's statement of reasons for not bringing suit, without investigation into the accuracy of the facts on which his refusal was based. 20 If the reviewing court finds the statement rational on its face, the Secretary's decision will be upheld. If the reviewing court finds the statement "so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious," 21 the decision will be remanded to the Secretary for a supplemental statement of reasons. The Supreme Court reserved the question whether a court can compel the Secretary to bring suit if supplemental statements remain unsatisfactory.
22
Bachowski was an attempt to achieve a compromise between competing statutory goals, but in practice the compromise has failed to realize either goal. Judicial review has contravened two of Title IV's enforcement objectives: protection of unions from potentially frivolous suits and speedy resolution of post-election controversies. Yet the scope of review granted in Bachowski is so narrow that it affords scant protection for the complainant's rights.
A. Impairment of the Enforcement Scheme
Title IV vests exclusive enforcement of post-election remedies with the Secretary in order "to prevent members from pressing claims not thought meritorious by the Secretary and from litigating in forums or at times different from those chosen by the Secretary." 23 [Tjo require the union to respond to these claims would be to circumvent the screening function assigned by statute to the Secretary. We recognize that it is less burdensome for the union to respond to new claims in the context of the pending suit than it would be to respond to a new and independent complaint. Nevertheless, we think Congress intended to insulate the union from any complaint that did not appear meritorious to both a complaining member and the Secretary. Id. at 537. 2 8 Since the 60-day limitation period was established for the protection of the union and its officers, the complainant's remedy necessarily involves a statutory right of the union-either the union must waive the limitation or the court must find equitable grounds for extending the period. 2 9 Moreover, the union may be prejudiced in the subsequent trial by certain judicial rulings on issues of law and fact if the reviewing court rejects the Secretary's reasons as "arbitrary and capricious" and the Secretary then brings suit. 30 Unions have frequently been involved as defendants in suits for judicial review of the Secretary's decisions not to sue. On at least one occasion, the union has intervened as a party defendant. 3 Cir. 1976 ). On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court invalidated the method used by the Secretary to assess the degree to which certain violations "may have affected the outcome" of elections where the violations are purely technical. Since the court in a Title IV suit (the same court as that which reviews the Secretary's decision not to sue) must overturn the election if violations "may have affected [its] outcome,"'29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1970), this novel judicial determination could be highly prejudicial to the union if the Secretary were ultimately to bring suit.
31. Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R. M. 3313, 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975 ), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977 Pa. 1975 ) (alleging that the "real" reason behind Secretary's decision not to sue was that "the Labor Department plays 'footsie' with the labor establishment to the disadvantage of 'rebels' such as plaintiff").
Although no court has yet explicitly addressed the issue, the courts' authority to join unions as defendants probably rests on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, for there is no independent statutory basis for jurisdiction over defendant unions. Supp. 1275 , 1277 -79 (D. Ariz. 1973 ) ("Ancillary jurisdiction is the broader concept allowing a court to acquire control of an entire controversy-both the claims and the additional parties-where it has no independent jurisdiction over one er more parties.") Plaintiffs, moreover, can obtain effective service of process on both union defendants and the Secretary despite the narrow language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970 Pa. 1972) . Since the 60-day limitation period is largely a protection for the union, its benefits may be fairly waived by the union's consent or unlawful obstruction.
Congress's concern for speedy resolution of post-election disputes is also evident in the requirement that the union member file his complaint with the Secretary within one month of exhausting union remedies or within four months of lodging his complaint with the union, whichever is shorter. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970 view fails to receive a meaningful hearing for his grievance unless the court has before it a full record disclosing the grounds for the agency's decision, as well as the arguments rejected by the agency. Indeed, most plaintiffs have pressed preeminently factual challenges, which are beyond Bachowski's narrow scope of review. 50 The cases for judicial review that have been brought or decided since Bachowski 51 illustrate the practical inadequacy of this narrow scope of review. The suits establish the following pattern: The union member files a complaint alleging that the Secretary relied on inaccurate facts or refused to sue for improper reasons. The Secretary asserts that the violations did not affect the outcome of the election and that his reasons, as reflected in his written statement, are rational. The complainant files motions for discovery, and the Secretary files a motion for a protective order. All parties file motions for summary judgment. The court ultimately (sometimes after obtaining a supplemental statement from the Secretary) dismisses the suit, and the complainant sometimes appeals. In three major cases plaintiffs presented colorable factual arguments, only to have the court dismiss the complaint because the Secretary's statement of reasons was not irrational on its face. 52 
Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review
The court remained dissatisfied with the revised set of reasons but felt powerless under Bachowski to do more:
[T]he court is not permitted to resolve the conflict between the Secretary's findings and plaintiff's conflicting and plausible statements, even though the Secretary fails to address himself to some points raised by Valenta that on this record seem to warrant analysis.... On the present record the plaintiff has not proved that the Secretary is acting arbitrarily .... But the failure of the Secretary to challenge these statements is disturbing."
In only one of the post-Bachowski cases has a reviewing court found the Secretary's statement of reasons "so irrational as to be arbitrary and capricious." This was the district court in Bachowski itself, which, on remand from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, invalidated the Secretary's method of computing the effects of election violations as internally inconsistent. This decision, resting on narrow and questionable legal grounds, is exceptional. 55 In general, the heavy judicial What internal union remedies exist to challenge a union election and whether a grievant has exhausted these remedies that do exist are matters of simple fact. The Secretary of Labor has no special knowledge and discretion with respect to their determination. The Court can and should make its own independent findings of fact on these issues and not merely review the Secretary's findings to determine if they are arbitrary and capricious. 55. In so doing, the court may have evinced some restiveness with the Supreme Court's decision by applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in a somewhat unorthodox manner. In calculating the effect that violations may have had on the outcome of the election, the Secretary distinguished between "cases where the number of votes affected can be ascertained with some certainty, and cases where it can not." Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976). The Secretary explained that with violations of the latter type, "it is impossible to prove one way or the other if any voters were actually intimidated by such violations." Id. The Secretary reasonably concluded that it would be illogical to say that these violations may have affected the outcome of the election with the same probability as the violations "when the impact on such votes was directly affected by a violation and the number of such votes could be measured with some certainty." Id. Moreover, the Secretary noted that "substantive violations of a type which may affect how a voter votes are to be distinguished from merely technical violations of a procedural character." Id. at 150 (emphasis in original). However, the court rejected the Secretary's distinction in this case and remanded to the Secretary to recalculate the effect that the violations may have had on the outcome of the election. Id. at 151. presumption in favor of the Secretary's decision and the lack of any factual investigation have foreclosed meaningful judicial scrutiny of the Secretary's statement of reasons. Such foreshortened judicial review affords meager recognition of the complainants' actual objections.
The second limitation inherent in judicial review under Bachowski is that a reviewing court which finds the Secretary's reasons arbitrary can do no more than remand for additional reasons. Although the Bachowski Court purported to leave open the question whether the reviewing court can compel the Secretary to bring suit, 5 0 such compulsion appears clearly beyond the judicial power as a matter of statutory and constitutional law. First, such judicial coercion would conflict with the statutory scheme. Courts have repeatedly recognized Congress's reliance on the "special knowledge and discretion" of the Labor Department in making decisions to bring Title IV actions." The Bachowski Court explicitly held that the reviewing court is "not authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of the Secretary not to bring suit." 5 8 Yet the Court only conceded that the congressional reliance on the Secretary's discretion "presents some difficulty" for the view that suit may be compelled.5 9 At least one circuit court Despite the Secretary's reasonable explanation for his method of computation, the court substituted its own judgment for that of the Secretary, seemingly contrary to the Supreme Court's admonition in Bachowski. 421 U.S. at 575.
Another court has suggested even greater willingness to go beyond Bachowski and expand the role of the reviewing court. In Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C. Circuit suggested (in dictum) that where the Secretary's statement on its face indicates a rationally based decision the court's task is at an end, unless the challenger makes a specific factual proffer of irregularity, in which event the burden of persuasion shifts to the Secretary to provide further supplementation (the ultimate burden of proof resting with the challenger). This conclusion seems contrary to Bachowski's holding that "review beyond the confines of the reasons statement" would be justified only where the Secretary's decision is "'plainly beyond the bounds of the Act [or] To mandamus a particular prosecution, a court would have to determine that no legitimate consideration informed the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute the individual in question. Such a determination would normally be very difficult, for a prosecutor may lawfully take account of many factors other than probable cause in making such decisions .... That the balancing of these permissible factors in individual cases is an executive, rather than a judicial, function follows from the need to keep the courts as neutral arbiters in the criminal law generally . . . and from Art. II, § 3 of the Constitution, which charges the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" . . . . Id. at 679 n.18. The Executive's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, applies to all laws, not merely to criminal statutes . . . . It would seem to follow that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, like the exercise of Executive discretion generally, is subject to statutory and constitutional limits enforceable through judicial review. .
. The law has long recognized the distinction between judicial usurpation of discretionary authority and judicial review of the statutory and constitutional limits to that authority. Id. at 679 n.19. Cases reviewing agencies' prosecutorial discretion have confirmed this distinction between courts' invalid usurpation of the prosecutor's discretionary authority and courts' valid check against abuses of prosecutorial discretion. 63. Under Title IV, once the Secretary has determined that violations may have affected an election's outcome, he must decide whether the case is "suitable for litigation." See note 81 infra. This executive judgment involves analysis of the probity of the evidence, the prospects of winning in a particular court, the likelihood of settling the case without litigation, and the allocation of prosecutorial resources. Before a court could compel suit, therefore, it would have to make the difficult determination that "'no legitimate consideration informed the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute the individual in question." Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). Because full factual inquiry is foreclosed by Bachowski, the court could make this determination only by requiring the Secretary to issue new supplemental statements whenever it was dissatisfied with a particular reason. Yet the Bachowski Court warned that "endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the written statement is inconsistent with the statute's goal of expeditious resolution of post-election disputes." 421 U.S. at 575.
64. The Bachowski Court reserved decision on whether a judicially-compelled suit would lack the requisite "adversity of interest" to constitute an Article III "case or controversy," 421 U.S. at 575 n.12. 70. Despite criticisms of the Labor Department's handling of Title IV suits, Congress still recognizes the importance of the Department's screening and expediting functions in processing them. UMW Hearings I1, supra note 8, at 3-4 (Sen. Javits), 70-71 (Sen. Taft). Even Senator Robert Griffin, a House sponsor of LMRDA and one of the leading critics of the Labor Department's enforcement of that Act, apparently favors administrative reform that would leave exclusive enforcement of the LMRDA with the Labor Department or t with some other government agency. Id. at 52-53 (colloquy with Sen. Taft). Senator Griffin recognized that the purpose of the LMRDA was "to strike a balance between the rights of individuals and the needs of the union as an institution." Id. at 51. But see Note, supra note 37, at 472-73, 567.
in Trbovich and Bachowski. 71 This Note proposes, as a more effective solution, that Congress replace judicial review with procedural reforms within the Labor Department.
Since courts have shown an increasing willingness to provide judicial review for decisions once assumed to be unreviewable, Congress should make explicit its desire to prevent review of agency decisions. 72 In order to subserve the LMRDA's overarching goal of assuring union democracy with minimal governmental interference, Congress should amend Title IV to preclude judicial review of the Secretary's decision not to sue. 73 However, in light of the recognition by both Congress 74 and the 71. Given the fact that the Secretary is the complainant's "lawyer" and that the complainant has a legal interest in the institution of the Title IV suit, the Department should provide procedural protection for complainants' interests. Generally, courts and commentators have recognized the need for procedures whereby individuals have a chance to be heard and to contribute evidence when agencies make decisions that affect their legal interests. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 72. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that judicial review of final agency action will be denied to the extent that statutes preclude review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law. APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970) .
However, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed these statutory exceptions to judicial review. Statutory preclusion of review is now established only by "clear and convincing evidence" of such congressional intent. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) approach). Nonreviewability of agency action "committed to agency discretion by law" has been termed "a very narrow exception" that is "applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945) ." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) . 74. During congressional hearings in 1970 and 1971, several members of Congress who had helped to draft the LMRDA expressed concern that private rights should be given greater recognition in the Secretary's enforcement of Title IV. Senator Jennings Randolph, a member of the Conference Committee that drafted the final version of the LMRDA, stated that "the basic thrust of the Landrum-Griffin Act, as passed in 1959, was to give to the individual worker a more direct and wholesome participation in the procedures and policies within the union at the many levels to which lie had the membership and the access." UMTV Hearings II, supra note 8, at 64. Senator Robert Griffin, one of the original House sponsors of the LMRDA, stated that "a primary Supreme Court 7 a of the complainant's interest in a Title IV suit, Congress should also amend Title IV to guarantee complainants notice of a decision not to bring suit, a right to be heard, and administrative review of adverse decisions. At a minimum, the Labor Department should promulgate rules requiring such procedures.
A. Administrative Reforms
The proposed reforms would alter current procedures by providing complainants notice and the right to be heard during the Department's investigation and the right to appeal adverse decisions to a professional review officer. 76 These reforms, modeled largely on the procedures used to initiate NLRB unfair labor practice cases and representation cases, 77 would revise the decisionmaking procedures of the Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA), 78 but the basic structure and investigatory nature of the LMSA's activities would not be changed.
The process now begins when the union member files a complaint with an LMSA Area Office. The Area Office first determines whether the complainant has exhausted his internal union remedies and has filed his objections with the LMSA in a timely fashion. If these requirements are met the Area Office undertakes an investigation-without consultation with the complainant-into the validity of the complainant's allegations and submits, usually within 30 days of receiving the aim of Landrum-Griffin was to protect the rights of individual workers within a union." Id. at 46.
But I also believed that when courts came to a situation where doubt existed [as to the meaning and purpose of Title IV of the Act], they would resolve the doubt in favor of the objectives of the law, which are to protect the individual worker and to give him the benefit of the doubt, as opposed to the entrenched union hierarchy. But I must say, almost without exception, the Labor Department and the courts have gone the other way, and consistently and persistently resolved all the doubts in favor of the entrenched union hierarchy and against the individual worker. 76. See Note, supra note 37, at 500 (arguing for greater complainant input in Title IV decision process).
77. See generally NLRB FELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971) . See K. DAvIs, DISCRErIONARY JUSTICE 207 (1969) (procedures of NLRB General Counsel's Office include "the major elements of a full structuring of discretionary power-findings, reasons, precedents, checks through appeals and through internal supervision, and procedural protections").
78. The LMSA is the dihision of the Labor Department that is responsible for administering most of the provisions of the LMRDA, including the provisions of Title IV. The LMSA is headed by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations in Washington. The LMSA has six regional offices (New York City, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco) and 24 area offices. U.S. complaint, a Report of Investigation (ROI) to the Regional and National Offices3 9 Based on the ROI, the decision (made in Washington) will be to bring suit if it appears that the violations the Area Office uncovered "may have affected the outcome of the election" 80 and that the case is "suitable for litigation."1 8
The proposed reforms would alter this process by bringing the complainant's point of view into the investigation. 2 Thus, the Area Director would appoint a hearing officer who would investigate the allegations of the complaint, consult with the union and complainant informally, collect sworn evidence in informal investigatory conferences or hearings, 3 82. Currently the local investigation does not seek the assistance and input of complainants. See Note, supra note 37, at 500; note 103 infra.
83. There are two models which form the basis for the proposed investigatory procedures: the Labor Department's own procedures in formulating rules for rerun elections under Title IV and procedures other agencies use in conducting informal, non-adversarial hearings.
The proposed hearing resembles the Labor Department's "Pre-Election Conference" in which the Department recommends rules to be followed in elections supervised by the Secretary under Title IV. After notice, a public conference is held at which the complainant, officers, and other union members may discuss remedies and proffer additional conditions to govern the rerun election. NLRB representation procedures are similar to, although more formal than, the procedures proposed in this Note. See NLRB FIELD MANUAL, supra note 77, § § 11000-11480. After a petition is filed, the Area Office contacts all interested parties and conducts a preliminary investigation into the allegations. Id. § § 11000-11016. Based on the results of this investigation the Regional Director determines whether a hearing is necessary. Id. § 11080-11080.4. An investigatory hearing is conducted at which the hearing officer entertains motions, seeks stipulations of fact and settlements, and arranges for an orderly development of pertinent evidence. Id. § § 11180-11184, 11200. Evidence is not limited to that admissible in court and may include materials from the Area Office file, testimony of witnesses, stipulations, documents, and records. Id. § § 11216-11230. The final decision whether to hold an election is made by the Regional Director and may be reviewed by the NLRB. formal determinations by which the union might remedy the violations voluntarily. 8 4 Currently, all decisions to bring suit are made in Washington by the Solicitor of Labor and the Assistant Secretary of Labor for LaborManagement Relations, after consulting with the Deputy Solicitor and the Bureau of Elections and Trusteeships.-The proposed reforms would leave such decisions to the Area Office. The Area Office would be required to give reasons for its decisions and those decisions would be final, unless the complainant or another union member appealed within ten days to a newly created Appellate Review Board, 86 consisting of three to eight Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). 8 The Board would immediately assign the case to one of its members, who would decide the appeal within 20 days. If questions of law alone were at issue, the ALJ would render a decision in Washington, the standard of review being "clear mistake of law." If the appeal involved ques-84. A "formal determination' is an agreement between the Department and the union that the latter will remedy the alleged violations voluntarily. UNION ELECTION CASES, supra note 67, at 5. Cf. NLRB FIELD MANUAL, supra note 77, § § 11188, 11200. The Area Office should include in the agreement a provision that the 60-day limit on filing suit would be waived if the union violates the agreement.
85. See UNION ELECION CASES, supra note 67, at 5; Note, supra note 37, at 496-99. 86. A direct analogue is the procedure for appeals to the NLRB General Counsel when a Regional Director refuses to file an unfair labor practices complaint. The Regional Director must provide a full statement of reasons for dismissing the charge. REv. 41, 43, 45 (1973) (rigorous screening process to ferret out best qualified ALJs). An ALJ is assigned to an agency by the CSC. He is then governed and bound by the agency's rules and precedents but is still highly independent in that he cannot be transferred, promoted, assigned nonadjudicatory duties, or removed without the prior approval of the CSC. Id. at 46; Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. REv. 9, 12 (1973); 5 C.F.R. § § 930.204-.234 (1976) . See generally M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE L.jW JUDGES (1974) . Based on length of service, judgment, and judicial expertise, the Commission grants pay raises and promotions, transfers ALJs from agency to agency (usually to agencies where they are at a higher civil service grade), and promotes ALJs to Chief Judges. See 5 C.F. R. § 930-204, .206, .210 (1976) tions of fact, as is more likely, the ALJ would go to the Area Office to conduct an informal investigatory hearing to resolve factual disputes, 8 The ALJ's opinion would be final s9 and would determine whether the Labor Department brought suit. 0 The objectives of the proposed reforms are to decentralize and professionalize the decisionmaking process and to give the complainant a greater opportunity to present his point of view. 91
B. Rulemaking
In order to facilitate a fair hearing and meaningful review, the Labor Department should promulgate, through rulemaking subject to judicial review, 92 guidelines for the decision process. 9 3 Under the 88. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 19.138 (1975) 90. During the ALJ's investigation, the hearing officer and the Area Office might continue negotiations with the union to seek settlement of the case or voluntary compliance and could be given limited powers to obtain from the union an extension of the time for filing suit. However, the Secretary should aaopt rules and procedures to govern the decision to seek an extension. See Note, supra note 34, at 1225-27 (suggesting that the Labor Department adopt express standards for seeking extensions and give complainants a chance to request expeditious handling of a case).
91. There are three ways to protect the complainants' interests in lieu of-or in addition to-the reforms suggested in this Note. Two alternatives-granting a more expansive scope of review and allowing complainants to bring their own suits against unions-do not adequately reflect Congress's concern that unions be protected from diffuse and potentially frivolous litigation. The third possibility is to allow complainants to bring pre-election suits under Title I of LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § § 411-413 (1970) , to protect individuals' rights to vote and to run for union office. These suits are less disruptive than the post-election suits brought by the Secretary, and it is arguable that Congress did not intend to foreclose these suits to complainants. See generally Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: Tile "Twilight Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 COLUt. L. REv. 1105 (1974) .
92. Under APA informal rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) , the agency must (1) publish notice of proposed rulemaking, including a description of the issues involved, (2) give interested persons an opportunity to participate through submission of written documents, with or without opportunity for oral presentation, and (3) formulate final rules, incorporating therein "a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rules invalid, because of insufficient public notice); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 COPRELL L. REV. 375, 380, 395-97 (1974) .
Commentators have long urged the increased use of rulemaking. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINIsmTLvTiE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.13 (1976); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATivE AGENCIES (1962) . Courts likewise have recognized the value of rulemaking in clarifying policy and protecting against arbitrary action. See, e.g., Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir. 1975) .
93. At present, the Department of Labor has published no formal rules for decisionmaking. Existing rules interpreting § 402 do little more than summarize the revised Title IV, for instance, the Secretary would not bring suit if the proven violations were too insignificant to have affected the election's outcome or if the case were unsuitable for litigation. 94 Rulemaking should be used to define standards for these cases. For example, more precise rules should be formulated for determining how much of an effect certain systemic violations of Title IV are presumed to have on the outcome of an election. 9 5 The rules might take the form of generalizations or simple hypothetical cases; 90 as such, they would offer uniform guidelines for hearing officers and ALJs, would give fair notice to complainants of the standards used to decide cases, and would be subject to judicial review to ensure that departmental policy comported with the goals of Title IVY Courts generally have not required agencies to formulate general rules for decisionmaking. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 294-95 (1974 22 (1974) : "For example, if one member was improperly denied the right to vote but all election contests were won by more than one vote, the Secretary would not bring a civil action because the violation could not have affected the election outcome for any office." 97. Congress should limit judicial review to independent attacks on departmental rules outside the context of particular enforcement proceedings. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427-31 (1944) (Congress has the power to provide that administrative rules may not be collaterally attacked in enforcement proceedings).
98. Such flexibility is necessary for the continued evolution of national labor policy. See COMPLIANCE 1974, supra note 78, at 5-8 (describing Secretary's suits challenging attendance requirements which preclude many union members from being nominated to union office); Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery, 45 U.S.L.W. 4089 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977) (Supreme Court agrees with Secretary's interpretation that rule disqualifying 96.5% of members from seeking office violates Title IV). partment could continue to fine-tune its enforcement program; this fine-tuning would be accomplished, however, by rulemaking rather than by ad hoc agency decisions. 9 9 To demand that an agency engage in self-limitation by promulgating rules is to demand not that an agency surrender its flexibility, but that it eschew resort to unprincipled or inconsistent decisions. 0 0
C. The Proposed Reforms and Title IV
The proposed administrative reforms mandate no fundamental changes in the Title IV decisionmaking process. Yet by restructuring administrative discretion the reforms would resolve Title IV's conflicting goals better than the Supreme Court was able to do in Bachowski. 10 The reforms would enhance the perceived fairness of decisions and give complainants a meaningful chance to be heard, without contravening other important goals of Title IV.
Fairness to Complainants and Protection of Their Statutory Rights
Title IV complainants and members of Congress have criticized the Labor Department's present procedures as unfair -02 Critics have ob- jected that the complainant has no opportunity to contribute either his evidence or his point of view, whereas union leaders are often in close contact with the Department's investigation. 103 They also argue that the standards governing decisions are vague and often suspect.' 0 4
Thus the present decisionmaking structure promotes at least the appearance of unfairness. 10 Because judicial review under Bachowski disclaims any inquiry into the factual basis of the Secretary's decisions, it has done little to allay doubts as to their propriety. 06 The proposed reforms would enhance both the appearance and reality of fairness in three ways. First, through public rulemaking procedures, the Secretary would formulate guidelines for decisionmaking that would constitute effective notice to complainants of what they must show in order to merit a Title IV suit. Second, the Secretary's investigation would be more open to participation by the com-103. The most common objection is that the Labor Department's investigatory and decision process is biased toward incumbents, since the local office consults the union in the course of an investigation (e.g., seeking evidence and possible settlement), but often ignores the complainant entirely. For instance, in 1970 union dissidents complained about violations of the LMRDA in the elections of District 5, UMW. Although the dissidents were eager to assist in the investigation, the Labor Department gave them little if any notice of its progress and instead entered into negotiations with the union. UMW Hearings II, supra note 8, at 31-34, 61-64. Kenneth Yablonski, an attorney for the complainants, objected that the Labor Department's nonenforcement was "a shocking example of poor administrative procedures, a built-in proplainant and other union members.' 0 7 Third, the process of investigation and review would be more professional, owing to the greater use of ALJs.1 05 By opening up and furnishing standards for the decision process, these reforms would provide a continuing check against administrative arbitrariness;' 0 9 and by providing for notice, participation in the investigatory process, opportunity to present and examine evidence, and professional administrative review by a disinterested 109. See note 113 infra. An instructive parallel may be found in the West German judicial system. That system provides for administrative review of prosecutorial decisions in criminal cases. If the prosecutor decides not to bring suit against an accused person, a private citizen may file a departmental complaint, initiating review of the decision by an official in the prosecutor's office; in addition, each prosecutor is supervised by a superior, who periodically reviews the prosecutor's files. Commentators have praised the procedures as an impartial and effective check on prosecutorial discretion, because the review is conducted by a professional at a higher level in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 465-66 (1974) . See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 194-95 (1969). decisionmaker, the reforms would contribute to greater public and complainant satisfaction with the fairness of Labor Department decisions. 110 Thus, precluding complainants from seeking judicial review of the Department's decisions would be neither an unconstitutional denial of due process"-' nor an elimination of a functionally independent check against abuse of discretion in the Labor Department." 2 The largely ineffectual judicial check against arbitrary agency action would be replaced with an open system of publicly promulgated standards, complainant input, and factual review of initial decisions. It has been persuasively argued that the latter system is often a more effective check on administrative arbitrariness-especially in the area of prosecutorial discretion-than is judicial review for "abuse of discretion." ' "1 3
Besides ensuring procedural fairness and enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the Secretary's decisions, the proposed reforms would pro-vide greater protection for the complainant's rights. The recommended procedures would be superior to judicial review under Bachowski because they would afford the complainant easier access to the review process, would enable him to be heard at a more meaningful time, and would no longer burden him with a heavy judicial presumption against his position.
The agency review process would be more accessible because it would bring the complainant's viewpoint directly into the investigatory process, at small expense and minimal red tape for the complainant. The Area Office would be required to consider the complainant's testimony and other evidence during the investigation and to assist him in framing his objections if he disagrees with the hearing officer's decision. 114 On review, the ALJ would elicit pertinent information from the complainant and other union members."; As a result, the complainant need not hire an attorney." 6 Should he choose to hire an attorney the cost would not be great, in view of the informality of the procedures and the short time devoted to decision and appeal. Presently, few complainants can afford the expense of judicial review; by replacing judicial review with more informal, less time-consuming procedures, the proposed reforms would make it easier for the average union member to obtain a hearing. "-7 The new procedures also would permit the complainant to obtain a hearing early in the decision process, when a hearing is more meaningful. The Bachowski Court characterized the Secretary as the complainant's "lawyer" and the reasons statement as part of his duty 114. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1975) 118 The Secretary would discharge his duty better by also engaging his client in prior consultation. Under the proposed reforms the complainant's opinions, factual data, and rebuttal evidence would be part of the record upon which the decision to sue is made and reviewed. 119 In this way, the complainant's factual presentation would become an important part of the decision process and could not be ignored, as it is under the narrow scope of review Bachowski prescribes.
Finally, the new procedures would relieve the complainant of the heavy presumption of agency correctness that inheres in judicial review for abuse of discretion under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Instead, the ALJ would reverse the hearing examiner and direct that suit be brought in cases where the examiner had committed material errors of fact or law.1 2 0
Minimum Interference in Union Affairs
Not only would the proposed reforms afford greater protection for the complainant's interest than judicial review, but they would do so with far less risk of impairing other statutory goals. Congress vested the Secretary with exclusive power to bring Title IV suits in order to shield unions from frivolous litigation and to effect speedy resolution of post-election disputes. Judicial review has frustrated these goals by enmeshing unions in protracted litigation. The proposed reforms would resolve complainant objections more swiftly and with less intrusion into union affairs.
Under the proposed reforms the Secretary's screening function is restored. Unions are spared the expenses of litigation unless expert decisionmakers within the Labor Department find probable cause to believe the complaint is meritorious. The union, of course, is free to participate in the administrative process and may elect to do so. But its presence cannot be coerced, as it is by joinder in suits for judicial review. Moreover, since the administrative procedures would remain essentially investigatory, rather than adjudicative, the union would not be burdened with formal pleadings, motions for discovery, large attorneys' fees and court expenses, or the publicity and harassment that frequently accompany a lawsuit.' 2 '
The proposed reforms would likewise preserve the statutory goal of speedy resolution of post-election disputes. The existing timetable for investigation would be retained, and most complaints would be processed to a conclusion within the 60-day limitation period. 12 2 The new procedures depart from the present system mainly by providing a hearing at the investigatory stage of the process and internal review after the initial decision regarding suit is made. The addition of an investigatory hearing should not occasion delay: indeed, the similar (though more judicialized) hearing procedure used in NLRB representation cases has proved expeditious. 123 121. Union officers currently have a legal duty to cooperate with the departmental investigation by providing the Area Office with documents and information. See, e.g., Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union, 490 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1974) (union duty to supply documents relevant to Secretary's investigation). The proposed procedures should prove no more burdensome. The hearing officer and ALJ would control the hearings, much as the Area Office now coordinates the investigation; complainants would have no independent discovery rights against the union or its officers. Attorneys should not be necessary, since the presiding officer would minimize legal technicalities by concentrating on the facts of the case and the applicable rules. Such "non-judicialized" procedures have found favor elsewhere. The NLRB (in representation cases) and Social Security Administration (in disability cases) have defended their informal processes and opposed "judicializing" decisionmaking hearings with formal pleadings, discovery, and rules of evidence. APA Hearings, supra note 108, at 219, 226-28 (statement of Frank W. McCulloch, then Chairman of NLRB, stressing the need for informal, rather than judicial and adversarial, procedures in NLRB representation hearings); id. at 151-52 (statement of Wilbur Cohen, then Under Secretary of HEV, praising nonadversarial Social Security hearings).
122. Exceptions may occur, as under the present system, for negotiating consent agreements. That is, the union may waive the 60-day limitation period in hopes of settling the case out of court. See note 34 supra.
123. The NLRB conducted 9112 representation elections in fiscal 1974. Eighty-two per cent of these elections were conducted within 44 days of the filing of the original Vol. 86: 885, 1977 The internal review process, moreover, will in large part replicate current LMSA procedures. At present, the decision to sue is made in Washington, based on review of the file and recommendations of the Area and Regional Directors. 24 Under the proposed reforms, the decision to sue would be made by an ALJ, based on review of the opinion and record of the hearing examiner. Because the internal review process would be nonjudicial it should move swiftly. Experience in the NLRB General Counsel's Office and the Veterans Administration, for example, suggests the value of such informal procedures in eliminating formalized motions and minimizing delay.' 2 5 It is a fair estimate that between 20 and 60 decisions would be appealed to the newly-created Review Board each year.1 2 0 The three to eight ALJs on the Board should be able to handle this caseload expeditiously. Finally, few of the appealed cases should require an entire de novo proceeding. Most will involve questions of policy interpretation or discrete facts; the ALJ would limit his review to the issues raised on petition. This 44-day period included the time spent on investigation, hearings, and preparation of a final decision by the Regional Director. See NLRB Hearings, supra note 83, at 6-7. This record is especially impressive, since NLRB representation cases, unlike Title IV cases, are adjudicated under no statutory time pressures.
124. See p. 907 supra. 125. In the late 1960s, the General Counsel decided appeals in an average of just over 20 days. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNsEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONs 1969-70, at 29. For a description of the procedures for General Counsel appeals, see note 86 supra. In fiscal 1974, disposition of cases certified to the Board of Veterans Appeals took on average about two months. Almost 1000 cases were processed by formal hearing before the Board. ADnMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AF-FAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 1974, at 121. The Review Board proposed for Title IV cases would be required to process far fewer cases, see note 126 infra, and would be held to rigid time limits.
126. During fiscal 1965-1974, an average of 130 Title IV complaints were filed with the Labor Department annually. About 45 complaints were dismissed each year in the Area and Regional Offices because the complainant either failed to exhaust union remedies or failed to file his complaint in a timely manner, or because the Area Office found no violations. In about 24 cases each year the Labor Department secured "voluntary compliance," where the union took corrective action without the need for bringing suit. COMPLIANCE 1974, supra note 78, at 4. Under the proposed administrative procedures, only a few of these cases (mostly those in which the Area Office found no violations) would be appealed beyond the Area Office. Of the remaining 60 cases (those in which suit was brought or where violations were found not to have affected the election's outcome), it is a fair guess that 25% to 50% would be appealed. 
Conclusion
Dunlop v. Bachowski is an important example of the functional, if not theoretical, limits of judicial review. In extending review to Title IV decisionmaking, the Bachowski Court overlooked two important facts: judicial review itself may undermine the scheme of statutory enforcement chosen by Congress, and a scope of review that is too narrow may strip judicial scrutiny of its legitimizing and checking functions. Judicial review is no panacea; the Bachowski line of cases illustrates one area of law where judicial review is not desirable.
Yet Bachowski does call attention to an important private interestthe union member's interest in the Secretary's Title IV suit-that had previously been slighted by courts and the Labor Department. The Court has initiated a court-agency dialogue that is groping towards standards and, one would hope, procedures to protect the individual's interest. But the most the Court can do is to pose the problem. The ultimate solution must come from the Labor Department or Congress.
128. Cf. NLRB FELD MANUAL, supra note 77, § § 10430-10438.4 (provision for exceptions to trial examiner's opinion to be filed by any party involved in representation case "to enable the Board to determine specifically what issues of substance or procedure it is being asked to decide").
